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Trading Claims During Bankruptcy After
Allegheny, Apex, Revere, and the
New Rules: Is a Goal of Chapter 11 Now More
Easily Obtained?
By C. Paul Champion ill, Esq.

I. Introduction
The decade of the 1980s witnessed
many corporations besieged by their
number one foe, the junk bond financed raider. As the decade ended,
however, a growing number of investors and corporate debt raiders discovered a new market in post-petition
bankruptcy proceedings. By trading
claims held against companies in a
Chapter 11 bankruptcy, new and better opportunities were created for
mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers
at lower transaction costs and higher
profits. However, the legal problems
surrounding these new markets have
frequently impeded and frustrated their
growth. The problem has been exacerbated by the competition between
the courts' sense of fair play and the
profit motive of business. The question then is, what role should the
bankruptcy court play in post-petition
trading of claims in a Chapter 11
proceeding? In addition to a historical
discussion on trading claims, this article explores the basic considerations
necessary to answer the question by
analyzing what bankruptcy courts have
done in the past, what they are presently doing, and what they should
consider in the future. The bankruptcy
courts' future considerations should
maximize results for creditors through
the efficient reorganization and distribution of a debtor's assets and liabilities.

II. Snapshots from the History of
Trading Claims

A. Debt Raiders: Who Are They?
What Do They Do?
As more and more deals from the
debt drenched 19808 unravel, a new tenn is
entering the Wall Street lexiCOn: debt
raider. 1 A debt raider is an investor
who trades in and possibly takes over
cash-strapped or reorganizing companies by buying strategic layers of their
debt. 2 Debt raiders come in all sizes,
configurations, and levels of respectability.
Various entities, including investment banks, money managers, pension funds and universities, have raised
close to 1.5 billion dollars to invest in
troubled companies of all sizes. 3 Their
targets are both publicly and privately
owned bankrupt companies. Most of
these funds are intended as passive
investments in securities of companies
in Chapter 11. Some funds, however,
will be used to purchase or trade
claims against bankruptcy debtors.4
Cost is the big difference between
the debt raiders approach of today and
theprevious decades' acquisition plans,
such as Leveraged Buy Outs
(ILBOs").s Fundamental to an LBO
is an analysis of the corporate worth.
The overpriced equity sets the asking
price. In contrast, buying up corporate debt on a discounted basis is a
much cheaper route than buying control in a company. The debt raider's
method, therefore, has the advantage
of requiring less financial engineer-

ing. 6
The successful techniques of these
corporate debt raiders have not gone
unnoticed by the more aggressive partiCipants in the bankruptcy arena.
Blending debt raider methods into the
traditional practice of trading claims
against insolvent debtors has yielded
many successes. Thus, the door has
been opened to the possibility of a
more innovative debt restructuring for
the Chapter 11 debtor. Nevertheless,
trading claims in bankruptcy proceedings has also served to contrast the
different objectives of law and economics.

B. Dissolving the Stigma
of Bankruptcy
The removal of the stigma and
financial embarrassment long associated with bankruptcy has encouraged
trading in bankruptcy claims. The
stigma began dissolving when Congress amended the Federal Bankruptcy
Code in 1978. The language of the
new Bankruptcy Code provides that a
petitioner is no longer labeled as bankrupt under the law; rather the petitioner is a debtor.1 Few among us
have not had the personal experience
of voluntarily being a debtor at one
time or another - including several of
our original thirteen states. 8 During
the past decade, we have observed
individuals and corporations enter
Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings
and exit as reorganized and operating
entities. Continental Airlines, Texaco
Oil, and ex-Governor John Connally
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are some of the more prominent names
which have helped alter the way in
which society views the merits of
bankruptcy.

hibit overreaching by future fiduciaries.
Ironically, this blatant abuse of the
public trust generated a compromise
that lead to an important historical
decision. The bills which enabled the
C. A Bad Stan & the Nation's
northern speculators to collect 100
Capitol
Historically, investors (as the pre- cents on the dollar on the claims
cursors to today's debt raiders) have purchased at a discount passed both
long sought to acquire claims against houses of Congress, but at a price.
bankrupt companies and governments. Southern Congressmen agreed to vote
Creditors of these entities often chose for the bills only if the nation's capitol
to sell or trade their claims for fear of would be moved to a site between
losing all of their assets or for other Maryland and Virginia on the Potomac
mitigating reasons. However, due to River. 12
what we would characterize today as
In spite of an embarrassing beginan " insider-trading lO-b" like viola- ning, trading claims gained momention, trading claims did not start off on tum and scope as the practice became
more prevalent at the tum of the 20th
the best footing.
Immediately after the Revolution- century. In the 1920s and 1930s,
ary War and prior to any federal investors purchased default railroad
bankruptcy law, many of the northern bonds and debentures. 13 Major Wall
states were insolvent debtors. 9 Dur- Street houses traded claims and stock
ing the war, these states had issued for profit and for control in the wave
debt securities to pay their soldiers' of reorganizations that followed the
wages and for military supplies. Mem- Great Crash of 1929,14 In the 1970s
bers of the First Congress of the and 1980s, many of the bank creditors
United States and some of their friends ofJohns-Manville, Inc., Storage Techbought these debt securities at consid- nology Corporation, Penrod Drilling
erable discount (10 to 25 cents on the Corporation, and Wheeling-Pittsburgh
dollar). At the same time, the Con- Steel Corporation sold their claims to
gressmen were considering legisla- various investors, rather than seek
tion that would have allowed the new control of the company, during the
federal government to purchase these Chapter 11 reorganization of those
same securities at 100% face value corporations. 15 More recently, in the
with the cash proceeds from the sale of Chapter 11 reorganization of Revco
D.S., Inc. there was an active market
public lands. lo
J ames Madison responded by in- and even a secondary market for bank
troducing legislation to deny the wind- claims against the debtor. 16
fall to the congressional members. He
proposed paying the original holders
D. Examples of Taking Control
of the securities 100% of their value,
In late 1988, Japonica Partners
but only paying prevailing market L.P. strategically purchased all of the
price to the subsequent debt security senior secured bank debt of Alleghtraders. Madison's bill was rejected eny, International, Inc., a company
by a House of Representatives in which that had filed for protection under
29 of the 64 total House members had Chapter 11 bankruptcy law Y J apurchased the discounted securities. 11 ponica went on to acquire the majority
While Madison was not successful in of the outstanding public debt of Alstopping fiduciary insider-like trading legheny which netted Japonica more
of claims in 1790, subsequent history say to influence the means by which a
reveals the development of a substan- reorganization plan would eventually
tial body of securities trading law that be adopted and approved by the Bankwould vindicate his efforts and pro- ruptcy Court. 18 The effect was that
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J aponica had launched the first hostile
tender offer for control of a Chapter
11 debtor by acquiring claims against
the debtor. 19
In another setting, trading claims
played a crucial role in the success of
a creative Chapter 11 debtor. The
debtor, Apex Oil Company ("Apex'),
was able to sell its major assets to a
claims purchaser and then effect a
" leveraged buyout" from bankruptcy.
Rather than having an outside third
party take control of the debtor, as in
the Allegheny scenario, Apex regained
the control of its company and its
financial destiny. Briefly, this is how
it worked.
Apex Oil Company had struck a
financing deal in 1982 with a group of
banks to receive a revolving credit line
for up to approximately $740 million.
Early in 1984, Apex suffered big
losses as the United States oil market
began to dry up. By 1986, Apex's
futures contracts for oil and its own oil
inventory had lost $175 million in
value. Apex was in serious financial
trouble. The banks accelerated their
notes and began foreclosure proceedings on secured collateral in December of 1986. On Christmas Eve,
1987, Apex filed for Chapter 11 protection. Apex was facing claims from
the banks for $545 million.2O
Amidst threats, counter-threats and
hostility from all parties, an asset
acquisition vehicle affiliated with
Horshom Industries, AOC Acquisition Corporation ("AOC"), and the
banks attempted to negotiate a specialized purchase agreement. Under this
agreement, the creditor banks would
sell their claims against Apex to AOC
at a discount. The banks would sell
their $545 million in claims for $396
million. After more negotiations about
representation and warranties and resell
rights, an agreement was reached.
The bank subsequently suggested that
the bankruptcy court order the validity and priority of their liens and
approve a waiver of any and all claims
of Apex against the bank group. With
the comfort zone of the banks suffi-

ciently widened, Apex took the next
step. Apex negotiated with AOC for
the purchase of Apex's major assets
by AOC. At that point AOC was
holding $545 million in claims against
the Chapter 11 debtor Apex, for which
claims AOC had paid only $396 million. Apex then agreed to sell its
major assets to AOC in exchange for
the full face value of the $545 million
in claims.
With the symmetry of a triple
play, Apex purchased back its creditors' claims of $545 million and AOC
walked away with major assets of
Apex Oil valued somewhere between
$396 million and $545 million. With
the elimination of $545 million in debt
Apex was able to complete the reorganization and remove itself from bankruptcy.21

E. Congress & The Savings and
Loan Crisis
The rapidly expanding frequency
and scope of trading claims has received increased attention from the
courts and may likely receive even
more scrutiny in the near future from
Congress. This is predictable because
of national and international events.
Once the President, Congress, and the
nation re-centers its collective attention away from the international
"Desert Storm" operation in the Persian Gulf and returns to domestic
matters, a major item on the national
agenda is the savings and loan crisis.
It requires little creative imagination
to foresee the practice oftrading claims
emerging as a new arrow from the
quiver in an effort to bring down this
national debt nightmare. Congress
would be asked to draft new regulations governing trading claims in at
least three areas - banking, securities
and bankruptcy. While this observation is speculative, in this writer's
opinion, the event is within the realm
of the possible.
In spite of trading claims' recent
meteoric rise in the world of corporate
finance, it has not enjoyed similar
success in the bankruptcy courts. Some

bankruptcy courts view trading of
claims with distinct suspicion, an overreaction to profit taking, and a primary misunderstanding of the real
world effect of trading claims on a
successful reorganization. It is apparent from recent court decisions that
reliance on the present language and
intent of Bankruptcy Rule 300 1(e) has
contributed to the courts' discomfort
in dealing with the practice of trading
claims.

In.

Regulatory Background &
Mechanics

A. Overlooked For Nearly
A Century
A look back in time at the growth
path of bankruptcy rules governing
trading of claims quickly reveals that
Congress has had little success in
keeping up with real world needs. In
1938, the heart of Chapter 11, as we
know it today, was cleaved out of
Chapter 10 of the Bankruptcy Act of
1898. Congress made such an effort
because its members wanted to prevent small businesses from cluttering
up the federal district courts' docket. 22
Consequently, Congress provided a
simple form under Chapter 11. The
separation of forms is important to
note. Chapter 10 contained guidelines
for trading claims and stock of debtors, but Chapter 11 did not. 23 In 1938,
the country was emerging from the
depression and the 1929 stock market
crash. The focus, therefore, was to
protect the security holding public.
Congress was less concerned about
trade and bank creditors. 24 Congress
apparently assumed the relationship
was such that creditors knew their
debtor and thus needed less protection.25 The law describes that kind of
relationship as one in which the parties deal at "arm's length." It is a
relationship, however, that has often
been ignored by bankruptcy courts
when faced with claims trading at 20
cents on the dollar.
Congress assumed that large corporations with publicly traded stock

and securities would end up using
Chapter 10 because it's provisions
allow any party to file a petition, while
Chapter 11 does not. In 1974, Congress heard testimony that revealed
that fewer than 10% of all business
reorganization cases were being filed
under Chapter 10.26 Even though
large corporations with publicly traded
securities were choosing Chapter 11
and not Chapter 10, there was still no
rule in Chapter 11 cases that applied
any of the safeguards of the Chapter
10 rules. Absent from Chapter 11
were the prohibitions against the misuse of fiduciary trust demonstrated by
those 29 members of the First Congress. Congress had made a mistake
which has still gone uncorrected today.27
One rule that did attempt to govern
the assignment of claims in Chapter 11
bankruptcy remained v irtual I y unchanged for nearly a century. The
Supreme Court adopted the General
Orders of Bankruptcy in 1898. General Order XXIII(c)(3) governed the
assignment of claims and was the
precursor to the previous rule,
3001(e).28 In 1939, the rule was
changed only from Roman to Arabic
numeric designation, 23c(3). In 1975
the Supreme Court redesignated 23c(3)
to 302(d)(I) and (2), and 10-401(c),
without material change in substance.
Again, in 1985, Rule 302 was restated
without material change, and became
the former Rule 3OO1(e)(1) and (2).29
With almost a century passing without
substantive change, the rule's fabric
has been worn thin by recent court
decisions. Rule 3001 (e) has not aged
gracefully. By early 1990 many Chapter 11 participants saw trading claims
as a significant established practice in
corporate bankruptcy proceedings. It
therefore became evident to Congress
that there was a need to adopt rules
more responsive to real world conditions. 30
Probably the last judicial gloss
applied on the prior version of Rule
3001 (e) came in July of 1990 from the
Honorable Burton R. Lifland, Chief
22.2Ifhe Law Forum - 5

Judge of the United States Bankruptcy
Court. Judge Lifland reasoned inlnre
Ionosphere Qubs, Inc. that" one of
the primary objectives of the requirement in Bankruptcy Rule 3001 (e) that
claims be 'unconditionally transferred '
is to enable the bankruptcy court to
monitor the manner in which claims
are transferred or assigned, and thereby
prevent inter alia the improper prol iferation of claims, wrongdoingand inequitable conduct. "31 Duringthesame
time frame that Judge Lifland was
interpreting Rule 3001(e), the Bankruptcy Rules Advisory Committee was
drafting the recently adopted change
that would remove, among other
things, most of the "monitoring" duty
from Judge Lifland's court.

B. Mechanics - Old and New
The Bankruptcy Code does not
establish procedures for the purchase
or sale of claims. There are no bankruptcy rules relating to the transfer of
claims prior to the filing of a bankruptcy petition. Prior to the adoption
of the new rule, when a petition for
reorganization was filed, previous Rule
300 1(e) prescribed some restrictions
on the transfer of claims not based
upon " a bond or debenture." A claim
might have been transferred by the
creditor of a Chapter 11 debtor after
the petition for bankruptcy was filed
and before either a proof of claim had
been filed or the claim had been scheduled. 32 All of this happened without
notice, hearing, or judicial approval.
Old Rule 3001 (e) required a statement
of transfer" acknowledging the transfer and stating the consideration therefore." Under the new rule, the " bond
or debenture" language is deleted and
replaced by " other than for security. "
The word" unconditionally" also has
been deleted along with the statement
of transfer language. 33 This substantive change can be viewed as further
evidence of the decision of the advisory rules committee to reduce the
courts' involvement in transferring
claims.
Under the old rule if an investor
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acquired a claim after a creditor filed
a proof of claim against the Chapter 11
debtor, then 3001(e)(2) would apply.
This part of the rule required the
transferee (purchaser of the claim) to
file evidence of the "terms of" the
transfer. Once this happened, the 20day clock started, and during this time
the creditor could object to the transfer. If the creditor/transferrer objected, the court could have still found
the claims "unconditionally" transferred, and thereby approve the transfer. Under the new rule, however,
"unconditionally" has been deleted
from this section of the rule. More
importantly, the new rule considerably scaled down the scope of any
disclosures by deleting the phrase
" terms of" from the previous requirement to provide evidence of the terms
of the transfer. Obviously, the provision greatly distances the court from
ever learning of the terms offered for
the claims. Remembering that it was
the knowledge of the terms in Allegheny that started Judge Cosetti on his
road to opposition to the assignment,
it's reasonable to expect that such
judicial objections are not likely to
recur in future similar cases.
The Committee on Bankruptcy
Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
Judicial Conference of the United
States through its chairman Lloyd D.
George, proposed in its June 5, 1990,
memorandum changes to Rule 3001 (e).
The changes are significant and substantive. The first sentence in the
following Advisory Committee Note
helps to underscore the significance of
the changes, and the remainder of the
text explains the substantive reasons
for the changes:
Subdivision (e) is amended to
limit the court's role to the
adjudication of disputes regarding transfers of claims. If
a claim has been transferred
prior to the filing of a proof of
claim, there is no need to state
the consideration for the transfer or to submit other evidence of transfer. If a claim

has been transferred other than
for security after a proof of
claim has been filed, the transferee is substituted for the
transferrer in the absence of a
timely objection by the alleged transferrer. In that
event, the clerk should note
the transfer without the need
for court approval. If a timely
objection is filed, the court's
role is to determine whether a
transfer has been made that is
enforceable under non-bankruptcy law. This rule is not
intended either to encourage
or discourage post-petition
transfers of claims or to affect
any remedies otherwise available under non-bankruptcy law
to a transferrer or transferee
such as for misrepresentation
in connection with the transfer of a claim. "After notice
and a hearing" as used in
subdivision (e) shall be construed in accordance with paragraph (5).34
There are those in the marketplace
who say the new rule makes claims,
such as bank loans, transferrable just
by notifying the clerk of the court
which would cut transaction costs,
give bank credits the same liquidity as
bonds, and, eventually lead to the
securitization of distressed loans and
trade credits. 35 Other observers contend that the relaxed rule should send
a message to the courts. "The business of business is making deals. So
let business buy and sell claims without undue interference of the bankruptcy court. "36 This observation summarizes the policy change in the courts'
treatment of trading claims, law, and
equity.

IV. A Question of Fairness

A. Passive Turns Aggressive
Traditionally, an investor's role in
bankruptcy proceedings was very limited and passive. Investors would take
the long term view toward profits.

Until recently, the most common bankruptcy securities traded by investors
were debt securities. 37 After buying
the securities at a low price, most
investors would wait and resell the
security when the value of the security
had bounced back, and, hopefully,
profit from the spread in the price.
Even though in a Chapter 11 proceeding, the investor, as a shareholder,
is able to exert some control of company operations through the stockholders' board of directors. So long
as the bankruptcy court did not appoint a trustee, the company would
remain as a " debtor in possession. ~8
The 1980s saw more and more bankruptcies. Investors, schooled in the
bankruptcy process, found ways to
speed up the return on their investments. They began not only to use
their equity position, but also their
status as holders of various types of
claims to gain access to the creditor
committees which structured the reorganization plan for the debtor company. This new access gave the investor the opportunity to increase the size
of the slice of the pie his class of claim
would receive after the bankruptcy
was settled. 39 It also was likely to
increase overall profits.

B. Disclosure - A Judicially Crafted
Device
The potential of an investor!claims
purchaser to cash in on huge profits by
actively seeking participation in the
Chapter 11 reorganization process did
not meet with full and supportive
acceptance of most bankruptcy courts.
Despite the limited role that bankruptcy judges are authorized to play in
connection with the transfer of claims
underRule3001(e), somejudges have
imposed the additional duty of disclosure on some, if not all, of the parties.4O
Judge Abram's decision in In re
Revere Copper and Brass, Inc. is a
good illustration of the use of the
disclosure requirement to ease one
court's discomfort with the idea of
trading claims. Two years after Re-

vere Copper and Brass, Inc. (Revere)
filed for Chapter 11 reorganization,
the Phoenix Capital Corporation
bought 28 different unsecured trade
claims held against Revere. Phoenix
had solicited its purchases by sending
letter notices to the trade creditors.
Phoenix paid 20 cents on the dollar for
the claims. 41
In compliance with then existing
Rule 3001 (e) (2) , Phoenix sought a
court order from Judge Abram to
complete the assignment of the trade
claims; however, she denied the motion. Judge Abram's ruling relied on
Bankruptcy Code section 112S(a)(1)
which called for a disclosure statement from the would-be claim purchasers to creditors" in sufficient detail to enable a hypothetical reasonable investor typical of holders of
claims to make an informed judgment
about the plan. "42 Clearly, Judge
Abram was fearful that the creditors of
Revere would sell their claims at huge
discounts and Phoenix would make
huge profits. Apparently, her Honor
gave little weight, ifany, to the" arm's
length" business relationship ofPhoenix and the trade claims.
In a variation on Judge Abram's
reasoning, Judge Cosetti sitting in the
Allegheny International bankruptcy
proceeding ordered that would-be
claims purchasers must make disclosure by notifying the debtor of proposed assignments, and further ordered the debtor to inform future claims
sellers of the debtor's estimate of the
value of such claims. 43 In this case,
Judge Cosetti was concerned for the
small creditors and how well they
were informed about the proposed
reorganization plan which was claiming a payment by Allegheny of 100
cents on the dollar. 44 Eventuall y these
two decisions, Revere and Allegheny,
and many others were reviewed by the
Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy
Rules. Logically, they asked thequestion, "Does anyone, other than the
seller of claims, have any standing to
object?" The committee answered
that question in the negative and went

on to propose amendments to Rule
3001(e) as previously discussed.
V. Economics

A. The Good
Generally, when a company files a
bankruptcy petition for Chapter 11 the
creditors holding claims and interests
against the debtor are losing money.
Consequently, the architects of the
reorganization plan are usually focused on minimizing losses so that
their respective institutions can focus
on profit making activities elsewhere.
In contrast, claims purchasers bring a
more optimistic agenda to the negotiating table. This optimism comes
from the fact that their voluntary presence at the table is predicated on
increasing the newly acquired claims
to make money. Mr. Sam Iapalucci
astutely characterizes this difference
in perspectives as" emotional money"
versus" rational money. "IS The former
being the original creditors and holders of debt interest and the latter being
the investing claims purchaser. Rational money claims purchasers are often
times more successful in reaching
settlement of the economic terms of
the reorganization plan. 46 This is true
because the new claims purchaser bears
none of the kind of hostility growing
out of unsuccessful pre- and postpetition negotiations between debtors
and original creditors. For these parties the difference in trading claims is
their profit making activity. 47
Trading claims appears to have the
potential of becoming a healthy practice in bankruptcy proceedings. This
is not surprising because trading claims
is premised upon a compelling and
persuasive fundamental reason. That
is, original creditors do not want to be
part of bankruptcy proceedings any
more than they want to lose money.
On the other hand, some investors!
debt raiders see trading claims in
bankruptcy as an attractive opportunity.
From the creditor's position" emotions" are often further layered by the
creditor's own real world needs. Of
22.21The Law Forum-7

course, such needs vary depending
upon who is the creditor, for example:
(1) some creditors may be
compelled to sell their claims
out of a need for cash;
(2) others may not want to
take the time or trouble to
follow a lengthy Chapter 11
proceeding;
(3) a sale of a claim may also
be necessary to establish a tax
loss; however, severe restrictions exist;
(4) creditors, such as financial institutions, may trade
their claims to avoid receiving certain types of distributions -- for example, stock -and the ensuing regulatory or
other complications;
(5) some creditors will sell
their claims on the " loyalty"
theory that they will be better
able to recoup losses on their
claims in their future business
dealings with the debtor;
(6) certain creditors sell because they view the current
and future relationships with
the debtor far more important
than any recovery on a claim
based on the debtor's past
failure to pay.
Law firms are likely to take this attitude towards their larger corporate
clients. 48
It is readily obvious that there are
several motivating benefits which bring
the original claims holder to trade,
sell, or transfer their claims. One can
only speculate as to who first approached whom in contemplation of
making a deal to trade a claim.

B. The Bad
There is a downside to the debtor's
and the creditor's participation in trading claims. Recent tax law developments have imposed significant tax
risks on a debtor corporation whose
claims are traded during, or in some
cases before or after, the bankruptcy
proceeding.49 Tax law changes under
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 have

8 - The Law Forwnl22.2

creditors and interest holders.
Japonica's actions ... make
abundantly clear that it is control profit that they seek. This
control profit will not be
shared through a reorganization plan . . .. J aponica
intends to use its newly acquired control to extract economic profit for itself, not to
maximize the results for all
creditors. 53
c. The Silly
Judge Cosetti's condemnation of
On August 2, 1990, the honorable Japonica Partners "control profit~
ChiefJudgeJoseph L. Cosetti sought, may have been accurate on the facts
in his lengthy In re Allegheny Interna- before him, but seems somewhat
tional, Inc. 51 opinion, reliance on the overbroad as a general statement of
secondary authority of Thomas H. law. 55 "It is not clear why the acquiJackson, The Logic and Limits of sition of a ' control profit' by a claims
Bankruptcy Law, to aid him in setting buyer should, in and of itself, be
forth the purpose of Chapter 11 versus prohibited under the Bankruptcy
Control Profit. Judge Cosetti's opin- Code. "56 Control profit can easily be
ion sets out the following text from established by new money from a third
that treatise as follows:
party who has not made the purchase
The basic problem that bankof even one claim. The third party
ruptcy law is designed to
non-claims purchaser can obtain control profit by funding the reorganizahandle, both as a normative
matter and as a positive mattion plan even over the dissent of
ter, is that the system of indiindividual creditors. 57 Similarly, an
vidual creditor remedies may
original creditor or shareholder can
be bad for the creditors as a
also acquire a control profit by agreegroup when there are not
ing to forego cash or debt securities in
exchange for the debtor's equity. 58
enough assets to go around.
Because creditors have conTherefore, it is not inequitable to
flicting rights, there is a tenclaims purchasers seeking control
dency in their debt-collection
profit that the court allow dissenters of
efforts to make a bad situation
the plan greater rights to block that
worse. Bankruptcy law replan just because the creditor happens
sponds to this problem ....
to be a claims purchaser and not the
original creditor or third party new
Bankruptcy provides a way to
make these diverse individumoney. 59 This paradoxical reasoning
is perhaps silly.
als act as one, by imposing a
collective and compulsory proceeding on them .... This is
VI. Conclusion
the historically recognized
One of the major goals of a Chappurpose of bankruptcy law
ter 11 reorganization is to achieve the
and perhaps is none too conmost efficient redistribution of the
troversial in itself.52
debtors assets and liabilities. SomeImmediately, the opinion continues times complete liquidation represents
with a conclusion from Judge Cosetti the most efficient redistribution, but
that:
only as a last resort. The free and open
trading of claims unimpeded by adThe purpose of reorganization is to offer an opportunity
ministrative rule or overly protective
courts offers one of the soundest ways
to maximize results for all
radically altered tax treatment of net
operating loss (" NOL ") conveyors following an " ownership change." Now
there are severe restrictions on the use
ofNOL conveyors. so While a detailed
analysis of tax consequences is beyond the scope of this article, the
message is clear - if you are going to
be a participant in trading claims see
your tax consultant and/or tax attorney.

to achieve this goal.
If a creditor extends credit to a
debtor based upon criteria acceptable
to that creditor, then the creditor has
made a business judgment designed
presumably to create a profit in the
face of known risks. If in the course
of events the debtor becomes insolvent and seeks the protection of Chapter 11 in a Bankruptcy Court, then the
creditor should not be surprised or
caught short because this event had to
have been calculated as part of the
original risk and credit criteria. Consequently, any creditor (large or small)
would be able, at any point in time, to
revalue its claim.
Should a third party investor offer
to purchase the claim(s) held against a
debtor in Chapter 11, the original
creditor would be able to respond,
based upon its needs, with what represents to the creditor it's most maximized and cost efficient response to
the offer. The creditor would either
keep the claim for having valued it
higher than the claims purchaser's
offering price or accept a negotiated
price and sell.
On the other side of the coin, a
trader in claims seeks an opportunity
to purchase an asset from the creditor
for adjusted value reestablished by the
debtor's insolvency. Such value judgment, not unlike the original creditor's
value judgment, is based upon criteria
and risk that are acceptable to the
claims purchaser. The claims purchaser, by virtue of its opportunity to
have established the adjusted value of
the asset, will have greater margin
within which to work than the original
creditor. This wider margin will
likely increase the probability of reaching an approved reorganization plan
and create a restructured debtor that
subsequently emerges with the most
efficient redistribution of assets and
liabilities.
In conclusion, trading of claims,
particularly under the new propo~ed
Rule 3001(e) and a more trustmg
court, can well serve one of the primary goals of bankruptcy law: to

achieve the most efficient redistribution of the debtor's assets and liabilil!ti~es:ir.._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
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